Who in their right mind would take on the task of trying to convey the state of current thought regarding how the human brain functions, as well as put forward a proposal for how to tie it all together, to both a nonspecialist and specialist audience, in a single volume? I cannot think of more than a few people on the planet who might have any chance at all of pulling it off without the hyperbole and sensationalism one often sees. Dana Ballard is one of those, and he does indeed pull it off. With any such attempt there are bound to be many points of contention -after all, as the author repeats throughout his book, there is still so much we do not understand about the brain, its structure, function, and behavior. Nevertheless, this is a very readable and much needed book. I can easily see it being a standard part of a reading list for graduate students starting off in neuroscience (computational or biological) or a core element of a graduate course. It would also be an excellent read for anyone seeking a snapshot of brain science. Even though this fi eld moves very quickly, adding many papers with new results and ideas daily, I feel Ballard's book will remain a strong contribution for a long time to come.
Ballard introduces early in the book the premise of his central goal, the hierarchy of abstractions that represent brain computation. He does this in three ways. First, he shows the hierarchical spatial scales present in the central nervous system (from molecules, to synapses, neurons, networks, maps, systems, and fi nally, the central nervous system as a whole; Figure 1. 3). Then, a description of similar, partly spatial, partly conceptual, scales for a computer is presented (starting with gates, circuits, microcode, assembly language, user programs and ending with the operating system; Table 1.1). Finally, he shows the levels of computational abstraction (Table 1. 2). This latter is important, but perhaps more diffi cult to appreciate. However, it is critical for understanding the nature of the computational problem being solved and decomposing it into manageable chunks. But, let's pause a bit here, and since the notion of hierarchical abstraction is at the core of the book's main thesis, examine the concept a bit deeper.
A hierarchy is a construct humans have used since ancient times, appearing in organizations of all kinds, some with few levels (shallow) some with many (deep). Nobel laureate Herb Simon describes their utility in a classic 1962 paper "The Architecture of Complexity" [1] . He describes a hierarchy as "a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem." Simon notes that in many biological systems, a hierarchy is defi ned in spatial terms, in terms of elements that are part of some larger physical structure. Physical structures are composed of parts and one can describe this compositionality hierarchically (exactly as in Ballard's Figure 1. 3). Simon further mentions that there may be different kinds of organizational principles for hierarchies in addition to compositionality. These may all co-exist and thus interact within the same set of hierarchical elements. In computer science, hierarchical data structures, such as the tree, emerged early to capitalize on the effi ciency gains they provide and a variety of types of hierarchical structures are in common use.
Within the fi eld of vision science, the concept of hierarchical organization has played an important role since David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel fi rst described hierarchical neural structures in the visual cortex during the early 1960s, and computationally since Leonard Uhr introduced the image pyramid in 1972. An image pyramid was a layered representation of an image, each layer being constructed out of mathematical operations performed on the image in the layer below. But hierarchies are not restricted to spatial, or visual, representations. Researchers on the topic of knowledge representation within artifi cial intelligence (AI) have put great effort into understanding how hierarchies can be defi ned and used along the additional dimensions of type, partition, generalization, classifi cation, inheritance and more [2, 3] .
Ballard begins his exploration of brain computation with a nice introductory chapter that explains the connections between computation in a brain and in a computer. Drawing this link is important because without it, a novice reader can easily go astray. The second chapter is a very well executed overview of the relevant brain science, useful for novices and experienced practitioners alike. Ballard provides all that the reader needs to understand the biological underpinnings of the rest of the book. Part II of this book dives into the specifi cs of modeling neurons, circuits, memory, visual maps, and behaviors. Neural coding and what it might represent is a major topic of this section of the book. Reinforcement learning methods have been strong
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R698 Current Biology 25, R693-R710, August 17, 2015 ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved components of Ballard's research enterprise, and it is not unexpected to fi nd a whole chapter, very well presented, on the topic. I particularly like the summary section 5.7, where a list of constraints that must be satisfi ed by programs in the brain is given.
Whereas Parts I and II focused on basic concepts and details of components, Part III puts these all together to see how they lead to behavior. The fi rst two chapters deal with the concept of routinesspecialized programs that encode the sequence of actions, sensory or motor, that are required to carry out behaviors. This is a critical idea, without which the many specialized abilities we know are present in the brain have no means of combining to support complex human behavior. The concept is not simply a useful theoretical construct, as Ballard presents strong evidence for such routines in the brain. To me, research into such routines -their characteristics, their locus in the brain, their function, their computational embodiment -is among the most interesting future directions, and Ballard motivates a very useful foundation for this. The third chapter of Part III presents the last level of the hierarchy, the component that actually makes behavior happen -the operating system. Here is where all the routines fi nally come together and where critical functionality is added, without which normal behavior would be impossible. The overall brain must have some element that is able to monitor the execution of routines, to determine if that execution is going as expected, to determine when a task had been successfully completed, and to make changes to the routines if the execution is in some way inadequate. There are also myriad implementation details to handle. Ballard shows, largely through examples from his own work, how this supervision might proceed.
The fi nal part of the book, Part IV, deals with awareness. Although I can imagine that I might understand something about vision biologically and computationally, I really am out of my element when it comes to awareness. So, I read this as a test of how well Ballard provides material for the novice. He fi rst addresses the task of making decisions, then considers how human emotions might come about and fi nally discusses the role of consciousness. In the decisionmaking domain, he describes animal experiments that show how monkeys can learn to play a game, and thus their neural responses can be studied. However, a subtle point arises: the animal performs as required in order to solve the problem the human experimenter imposes on it, namely dehydration. The monkey does not play for the sense of fun -does this make a difference in how the results appear or are interpreted? A second question also arises when Ballard explains how game theory can be used to model the decision-making process itself. Is there a difference between using a mathematical abstraction such as game theory (or Bayesian probability, as another example) and the actual process that neurons execute?
Nevertheless, this development has come a long way from neural codes, as described earlier in Part II. At this point in time one cannot say that the brain executes Bayes theorem or executes game theory. Does this distinction make a difference or does the mathematical abstraction suffi ce, and if so, how? These may not be easy questions to answer, but the book provides a good foundation for asking the right questions.
Ballard then moves on to consider emotions, presenting a set of elements within his computational emotional hierarchy -language, signaling, cortex, limbic, hypothalamus and basic body needs. That all these components are needed seems clear, but this decomposition might be too abstract. The fi nal chapter deals with consciousnessto many, the biggest mystery about our brain. Whereas the proposed hierarchy is at least in part physical and compositional, consciousness is a property of the whole system, in my opinion, and seems more diffi cult to fi t. His fi nal description of the brain hierarchy of Table 11 .1 goes from operating system at the top, through debugging, scheduler, programs, routines, data abstraction, neurons and synapses at the bottom. The top levels are suggested as necessary to accommodate conscious behavior, and it is clear that being able to reason about what one is doing is part of awareness, but is that all? It is a topic that awaits additional research.
An examination of how the human brain might perform its magic necessitates broad coverage of topics and in order to make it manageable (let alone fi t into book form) necessitates that some topics be addressed with broad brush strokes only. Sometimes, those broad strokes leave gaps; for this reviewer, those gaps are over issues around hierarchies, feedback, and attention. But Ballard anticipates such gaps. From in his preface: "The net result is that the descriptions of either side [biology and computation] may disappoint the specialist, but the focal intent is to point out connections that may promote new understanding". I offer the following with the same constructive intent.
Some historical perspective on hierarchical organization has been given earlier. One also might wonder whether one could defi ne hierarchical organization principles for brain computation related to a sub-classifi cation of neural connections? In other words, are all neural connections -whether feedforward, lateral or feedbackfor the same purpose? Could those organizational principles developed by AI researchers provide guidance for such a consideration? I would think that in the same way that there is a myriad of neuron types, each with different functionality, that there might be many types of connections among neurons, each with different characteristics and function. The only thing I can conclude is that Ballard's abstraction hierarchy presents us with a great starting point, making clear the sorts of questions we need to consider in order to make further progress.
Another issue is that of feedback. Although Ballard does include feedback as part of his overall strategy, I was eager for more, but perhaps this was inevitable. Our understanding of the role (or most probably, roles) of feedback or recurrence in the brain is quite limited (see [4] for a brief overview). Herzog and Clarke [5] present convincing evidence suggesting that cortical processing is not purely hierarchical and feed-forward. They claim that in order to know how the visual system processes fi ne-grained information at a particular location it is necessary to integrate information about the surrounding context over the entire visual fi eld. Grouping and segmentation are crucial to understanding vision, and must be understood on a global scale.
Their conclusions feed right into Ballard's plan, it seems. Ballard describes a feedback role for learning weights within receptive fi elds, motor control feedback, how feedback from routines can adjust interpretation based on expectations, and more generally how feedback from one level can infl uence processing at lower levels. He correctly emphasizes the importance of understanding feedback on p. 155: "it is unlikely that the cortex can be fully understood without accounting for their [feedback connections] purpose." However, this critical aspect of brain computation doesn't seem to make it smoothly into the abstraction hierarchy he proposes. Even the use of the term 'abstraction' comes with a tacit implication of a single direction -I cannot think of a term for the other direction. In other words, if the act of abstracting removes detail to leave the essence exposed (as discussed earlier), what is the action of adding back that detail? I suspect that Ballard believes in a broader role for feedback, with which I would fully agree, and feel this should have been more forcefully emphasized within his hierarchy.
My fi nal point concerns the nature and role of attention and attentional processing. Figure 8 .2 summarizes how Ballard views attention and labels the attentional level of processing as the 'debug' level, that is, processing that simulates a task and determines if the execution of that task is conforming to expectations. The time scale at which this operates is 100 seconds. He also previously mentions attention in the context of 'changing the agenda' (Section 6.5), a stimulus-based form of attention to potentially interesting locations in an image. The chapter continues by drawing an analogy with the famous Posner description of attention as consisting of alerting, orienting and executive components. However, research of the past 25 years has shown that the neurophysiology of attention is far more complex. For example, a well-established observation is that single neurons, almost everywhere within the visual cortex, can show different behaviors depending on attentional infl uences [6, 7] . Moreover, there is a distinct temporal pattern to the emergence of these different behaviors throughout the cortex that can only be seen if one looks simultaneously at multiple areas and at a timescale where they are visible, 100-250 milliseconds. And there is more, as is easily seen in the two volumes cited above. I do not feel these can be relegated to the category of implementation detail; rather they are important constraints on whatever theory one might propose as explanation.
However, the current state of experimental and theoretical work on attention provides little guidance for Ballard. The community has not yet converged onto answers for the big 'what, where, how, why, when' questions in attention. The real problem is that there are a variety of phenomena that are all grouped under the rubric of attention, when, in fact, a fi ner-grain taxonomy could be more illuminating [8] . As a result, as Ballard notes on p. 282, each of his uses of Posner's three kinds of attention result in "interestingly different interpretations from those used in the psychological domain." I think this is unavoidable if your goal is to make attention actually work. The computational approach requires that details be fi lled in, connections be completed, and performance from signal to agent action be evaluated. The experimental work is indispensible to be sure; but as Ballard shows, it must be complemented by computational considerations in order to connect observations. The experimental and theoretical literature that is relevant to Ballard's enterprise is vast and complicated. The range of possible interpretations that might arise from this literature is even larger. Ballard's extensive set of references gives the reader one possible path through the vastness of experiment, observation and interpretation. It's really all about how one chooses the constraints that lead to the path [9] . It is not an exaggeration to say that one can fi nd peer-reviewed results to support almost any theory or interpretation of results. And this can lead newcomers onto pathways of vast variety and uncertain utility. Ballard is not one of these, and his wealth of experience, impressive knowledge, technical talent, and insight, developed over decades of study, shine in this volume. He presents a pathway for theorizing about the brain that is plausible, broad, due to its coverage of early sensory issues and consciousness and social components alike, and very diffi cult to discount. All of my own comments, even those that appear critical, are in fact simply elaborations of portions of his pathway.
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Current Biology 25, R693-R710, August 17, 2015 ©2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved Ballard roots his development in the language of computation, the only tool available with which we can express the full breadth of necessary concepts, from mathematics to logic, representations, input and output, algorithms, control, systems, memory, interaction, and more (see also [8] ). He uses this full breadth of computational methodologies far more effectively than seen previously and thus makes a more powerful statement for their utility than David Marr or others.
The path Ballard presents is perhaps best considered using his own main argument: it is an abstraction. As an abstraction, and if a correct abstraction, future efforts should be able to defi ne the subelements of his plan in such a way so that the overall plan remains intact and does not deviate. How will we know if this is the correct path? What does it predict and how can we test those predictions? The path laid out is suffi ciently rich to motivate much experimental work that would answer these questions. I feel that Ballard has successfully navigated the oceans of available constraints, and plotted a course that will provide guidance for quite some time to come. This book is a 'must read' for anyone interested in understanding the human brain. What turned you on to biology in the fi rst place? I came to biology through a love of natural history. As a young boy, growing up in Canberra, the family home was on the other side of the road from a sheep station. Parrots would fl y in to drink at our fi sh pond and I have vivid memories of thornbills feeding a much larger cuckoo chick. I became a fanatical bird watcher until academic biology created different obsessions. Colleagues have come to biology for different reasons. Some want to understand how things work, to cure disease, or to fi nd an outlet for their mathematical talents. These initial motivations often have long-lasting effects on what questions they fi nd interesting. As a general rule, biologists who start as naturalists are more likely to be interested in questions of adaptive function and less motivated by questions of mechanism. As a university student, I gradually moved from a primary focus on traditional ecology to an interest in the natural history of the genome, but my ecological training remains of great value. It is the environment that selects which phenotypes transmit their genes to future generations. In this very real sense, it is ecology, mediated by phenotype, that determines genotype.
David Haig

Who were your key early infl uences?
My mother was a biology teacher. I received a broad education in classical biology at Macquarie University without taking a course in molecular biology (that was still possible). My most important mentors were Mark Westoby and Dick Frankham, my guides in ecology and genetics. Mark became my doctoral advisor. Naomi Pierce nominated me for a fellowship that brought me to Harvard.
If you had to choose a different fi eld of biology, what would it be? If I had the freedom of a doctoral student to take on a new area for evolutionary analysis it might be endocrinology. The major adaptive tradeoffs in organismal life histories are mediated by hormones that constitute summaries, one might say 'principal components', of where an organism stands in the adaptive space of life-history tradeoffs. A better understanding of these tradeoffs should illuminate the organization of the endocrine system and an adaptationist perspective on endocrinology should inform understanding of life-history.
Which paper has most infl uenced you? Much of my career has been spent exploring the implications of Robert Trivers' paper on parent-offspring confl ict from 1974. Many at the time rejected the concept because it seemed obvious that parents obtain their fi tness through offspring and what is best for one should be best for the other. Forty years on, I still hear versions of these arguments. Part of the resistance is a trivial misunderstanding. The theory of parentoffspring confl ict defi nes the conditions under which interests confl ict but at the same time defi nes the conditions under which they coincide. Cooperation and confl ict are two sides of one coin. Yet, one often hears argument of the form "parents have evolved to care for their offspring, therefore there is no confl ict". The premise is impeccable while the conclusion is fallacious, but I suspect resistance to parent-offspring confl ict has deeper roots because it challenges some deeply held myths about parents and offspring in particular and the evolutionary process in general.
What do you mean by 'myths'?
We have a deep desire to see the natural world as fundamentally benefi cent and natural selection as promoting individual well-being. Maximizing the probability of survival of an individual child is different from maximizing the number of surviving children. Therefore, adaptations of parents are expected to balance benefi ts to particular children against costs to fertility. Modern parents are not fi tness maximizers, but our psychology has been shaped by this evolutionary trade-off. We balance parental responsibilities with other demands but feel uncomfortable with the suggestion that sometimes our needs are ranked above those of our children. We tell ourselves, and our children, we want only what is best for them. But our children recognize such parental protestations as self-serving.
